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Abstract 
 This contribution reflects on the functioning of the East African Court of 
Justice (EACJ) and judges its effectiveness by assessing the Court's 
role of ensuring adherence to, the application of and compliance with 
the East African Community (EAC) Treaty. The EACJ became 
operational on 30 November 2001, following its inauguration after the 
swearing in of its judges and the Registrar. During this initial stage of 
the Court's existence there were indications that the EACJ was failing 
to stamp its authority on the activities of the Community. The main 
reason for this failure is the existence of gaps in the EAC Treaty, which 
prevent the EACJ from effectively discharging its functions. In addition, 
as shown in this article, the EACJ has been delivering judgements on 
the grounds of doubtful authority which has gradually diminished the 
Court's legitimacy. Given its relevance to the EAC, this may therefore 
be the time to audit the EACJ's functioning and reflect on whether it is 
moving in the right direction. The hypothesis of this article is that the 
EACJ has been struggling to establish its authority in the region, 
mostly in the areas of human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance. In tracing its history so far it is easy to discern its strategic 
attempts at judicial law-making to arrogate to itself the role of the 
protector of human rights. While it is acknowledged that the EACJ is 
increasingly receiving cases of a divergent nature, most of these cases 
have had little influence on the integration project or are outside the 
scope of its mandate.  
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1 Introduction 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) came into being on 30 
November 2001, after an inauguration ceremony that signified the 
commencement of operations of the East African Community’s (EAC) 
judicial organ.1 Not much happened during the Court's infancy. It was not 
until 2005 that the EACJ received its first case - four years down the line 
since its inception. Being the judicial arm of the EAC, the EACJ is 
important to furthering the EAC project. As per article 23 of the EAC 
Treaty, the EACJ is entrusted with the role of ensuring adherence to, the 
application of and compliance with the EAC law. In fulfilling this initial 
mandate, the EACJ is expected to shape the EAC integration project. The 
only way the EACJ can be influential is by having its decisions complied 
with by the Member States, as well as by amending some of the EAC 
Treaty provisions which circumscribe the accessibility and availability of 
justice before the EACJ. 
So far the EACJ has attempted to fulfil its mandate by adjudicating on a 
diverse range of issues, ranging from trade,2 human rights,3 the free 
movement of persons,4 environmental law,5 to disputes involving EAC 
employees,6 and to matters concerning the election of members of the 
East African Legislative Assembly (EALA).7 Despite the strides it has 
made, the Court continues to encounter difficulties which are preventing it 
from fulfilling its duties, particularly those directly touching on the 
                                            
* Ally Possi. LLB (Mzumbe) LLM (UCT) LLD (Pretoria). Deputy Solicitor General of 
the United Republic of Tanzania. Post-Doctoral Fellow, Faculty of Law, North-West 
University, South Africa. Views expressed in this article are solely of the author's 
opinion and not representing the position of the Office of the Solicitor General of 
the United Republic of Tanzania. Email: ally.possi@hotmail.com  
1 EACJ date unknown http://eacj.org/?page_id=19. The inauguration ceremony 
included the swearing in of EACJ Judges and the first Court Registrar. 
2 Modern Holdings (EA) Limited v Kenya Ports Authority Ref No 1/2008 (11 February 
2009); Alcon Intl Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank of Uganda Ref No 6/2010 (2 
September 2013). 
3 EALS v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 1/2014 (15 May 2015); Democratic 
Party v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 1/2014 (28 July 2015); Tusiime v 
Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 11/2013 (7 August 2015); Rugumba v Attorney 
General of Rwanda Appeal No 1/2012 (21 June 2012). 
4 Mohochi v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 5/2011 (17 May 2013). 
5 ANAW v Attorney General of Tanzania Appeal No 3/2010 (26 April 2012). For a 
general discussion of the case also see Gathii 2016 Chi J Int'l L 386-438. 
6 Amudo v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 4/2014 (30 July 2015). 
7 Anyang' Nyong'o v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 1/2006 (29 March 2007); 
Komu v Attorney General of Tanzania Ref No 7/2010 (26 September 2014). 
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integration project. Tracing back the history, the EACJ is trying to emulate 
the defunct East African Court of Appeal (EACA), established during the 
days of the former EAC.8 The EACA had jurisdiction to determine only civil 
and criminal appeals originating from the decisions of the national courts 
of the then EAC Member States.9 Its case law is highly appreciated by 
legal practitioners and jurists across the EAC region even today. 
Understandably, the current EACJ would not want to fall short of the 
legacy of its predecessor. 
The current EACJ was established at the time of the proliferation of 
international adjudicatory bodies during the 1990s. Currently the EACJ 
serves the EAC, which is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of 
six countries. South Sudan has recently acceded to the EAC Treaty and 
become the most recent member,10 joining Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda. The admission of South Sudan into the bloc was 
received with mixed feelings. This is because, without a doubt, the 
Country's economic and political condition as well as its track record in 
governance, human rights and the rule of law (which are key tenets for 
inviting a new member into the EAC) invites many questions on its 
admission.  
Regional integration in East Africa dates back to 1967, when the former 
EAC was established.11 The 1967 Co-operation collapsed due to 
economic and political differences among the then Member States. Being 
aware of the importance of regional integration, the EAC was re-
established in 1999 through the signing of the Treaty Establishing the 
EAC.12 The EAC Treaty, to which the Member States have consented, 
                                            
8 The former EAC was established in 1967 and collapsed after ten years of 
existence.  
9 The EACA could handle only appeals, on both civil and criminal matters, except for 
constitutional matters and the offence of treason for Tanzania. 
10 EAC 2016 http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/statements/20160415/communique-
signing-ceremony-treaty-accession-republic-south-sudan-east-african-community. 
The admission of South Sudan into the EAC was questioned by the applicants in 
Walusumbi v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 8/2013 (27 February 2015). The 
matter came about due to the norms established by art 3 of the East African 
Community Treaty (1999), which lay down criteria for a country to be considered 
eligible to join the EAC. It is highly doubtful that South Sudan satisfies the criteria 
listed.  
11 Birmingham 1969 Va J Int'l L 408-443; Orloff 1968 Orloff 1968 Colum J Transnat'l L 
302-332. 
12 The EAC Treaty was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered into force on 7 
July 2000. By then the Community had been established by the three original 
Member States - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda acceded to 
the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007 and effectively joined the Community on 1 July 
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features the EACJ as an international court.13 The current EAC has a 
range of objectives in the social, political, cultural, economic and legal 
contexts.14 Eventually, Member States aim to attain political federation.15 
Achieving that goal will require a robust judicial body capable of resolving 
integration disputes, amongst others; in this case, the EACJ.  
The EAC is one of many Integration projects across the globe. 
Regionalism in Africa has been relatively fruitful. Initiatives for regional 
integration in Africa gathered pace after the formation of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) in 1963.16 This initiative began with the 
establishment along geographical lines of regional blocs in the form of 
economic communities.17 RECs or sub-regional organisations have since 
concerned themselves with the implementation of regional agendas. Prior 
to the 2000s, RECs were established to advance the underperforming 
African economy. After the end of the Cold War and with the new 
emphasis on the rule of law, good governance and human rights global 
ideals, Africa had to re-assess itself. This resulted in institutional 
transformation as well as legal reforms. The OAU was transformed into the 
African Union (AU) in 2002, and at the same time, the sub-regional blocs 
reinvigorated themselves in alignment with the new vigour in the world 
order. They established judicial organs able to conduct checks and 
balances in their organisational activities. Sub-regional courts such as the 
EACJ are now playing different roles in strengthening regional integration 
within their respective groupings. They are expected to be instrumental in 
improving trade relations in their communities. In addition, human rights 
and the rule of law have emerged as major issues of contention in these 
courts. One of the factors that has led to the establishment of sub-regional 
groupings across the globe has been the acceptance that their judicial 
bodies may adjudicate human rights disputes.18 
                                                                                                                       
2007. South Sudan acceded to the Treaty on 15 April 2016 and become a full 
Member on 15 August 2016. 
13 Article 9(1)(f) of the EAC Treaty.  
14 Article 5 of the EAC Treaty.  
15 Article 5(2) of the EAC Treaty.  
16 The OAU was established on 25 May 1963 and was replaced by the AU on 9 July 
2002, after the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the AU. For an overview of 
African regional integration initiatives, see Hailu 2014 Mizan L Rev 299-332. 
17 After the establishment of the OAU, sub-regional groupings started to emerge. 
These include: the EAC (1967), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) (1975) and the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference 
(SADCC) (1980). 
18 For example, see Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 SUR - Int'l J Hum Rts 119-143.  
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Contemporary scholarship dealing with the functions of sub-regional courts 
notes that the adjudication of human rights is one of their desirable 
functions, but it is becoming common to find these courts struggling under 
the burden of having to deal with a multiplicity of matters in addition to 
those initially entrusted to them.19 As a result, they have not been able to 
stamp their authority on their respective communities in matters of either 
trade or human rights. Most RECs have become economically oriented 
institutions and are missing out on advancing their communities in 
important matters such as democracy, good governance and human 
rights.  
This contribution revisits the EACJ's functioning and effectiveness. In 
doing so, the legal challenges affecting the functioning and effectiveness 
of the Court are identified. Thus, the article is divided into four sections. 
The first section is an introductory section that sets out the scope and 
purpose of the article. The second section gives an insight into the EACJ, 
revealing the Court's structure, composition and functioning. In this 
section, the legal challenges hindering the EACJ in its attempts to 
effectively discharge its duties are addressed. The third section of this 
article captures the issues mostly dealt with by the EACJ from its inception 
to present. This is an important part of the article, where the Court's 
progress is put to test. In the process, legal issues concerning the EACJ's 
functioning and effectiveness are addressed. Then, the fourth section of 
this contribution provides some concluding remarks.  
2 The EACJ: An emblem of EAC integration 
The EACJ has a separate existence within the EAC institutional 
architecture. It is a judicial instrument modelled to "ensure the adherence 
to the law in the interpretation and application of and compliance" with the 
EAC Treaty.20 It is this function that the EACJ has not performed 
satisfactorily, as a result of the lack of a clear jurisdictional mandate and a 
machinery capable of enforcing its decisions.  
The disputed 2007 Treaty amendments structured the EACJ into two 
layers – the First Instance Division (FID) and the Appellate Division (AD).21 
The establishment of the AD at that time was greeted with suspicion. It is 
widely known that the EAC Treaty amendments were the outcome of 
                                            
19  See Possi 2015 AHRLJ 192-213. 
20 Article 23 of the EAC Treaty.  
21 Article 23(3) of the EAC Treaty. Matters from the FID are appealed to the AD, 
subject to art 35A of the Treaty.  
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Kenya's retaliation against the EACJ decision in Anyang' Nyong'o v 
Attorney General of Kenya.22 The restructuring of the Court aimed at 
giving Kenya the chance to appeal the Anyang' Nyong'o decision.23 During 
the early days of the AD's functioning, it was easy to recognise its 
regulatory role over the FID. This statement may be harsh, but it is made 
on the basis of the AD reasoning on appeals originating in the FID. As will 
be shown in this article, the AD has taken a more conservative approach 
to matters concerning the Court's time limitation rule and allegations 
relating to human rights, thus retreating from the more progressive 
approach adopted the FID. It was the AD that declined to uphold the well-
established doctrine of continuing violation, which was initially invoked by 
the FID to condone the infringement of the time-limit rule for instituting a 
case. However, the AD remains an important avenue for litigants who wish 
to exhaust the available remedies within the EAC judicial realm. It is also 
acknowledged that the new set of EACJ judges has shown signs of being 
more pro-active than their predecessors. Notably, in DP v Secretary 
General of the EAC24 the AD pronounced that the EACJ may receive 
human rights cases and adjudicate them based on the human rights 
norms provided in the EAC treaty.25 It appears, then, that the future at the 
AD may be brighter than the present, as far as the progressive 
interpretation of the EAC treaty is concerned.  
The Court is composed of not more than fifteen judges: ten in the FID and 
five in the AD.26 They are appointed by the Summit - the topmost political 
organ of the EAC.27 It appears that the composition of the EACJ judges is 
structured on the basis of nationality among the Member States. With 
South Sudan being in the mix, an amendment to the EAC Treaty looks 
certain in relation to the future composition of AD judges. It is unclear how 
the set of five judges will be apportioned to six Member States, all of which 
are determined to be represented on the AD. Perhaps a future solution 
                                            
22 Anyang' Nyong'o v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 1/2006 (29 March 2007). 
23 For a discussion on the controversial 2007 EAC Treaty amendments, see Onoria 
2010 J Afr L; Alter, Helfer and McAllister 2013 AJIL; Van der Mei 2009 ZaöRV. 
24 Democratic Party v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 1/2014 (28 July 
2015). On the case and the significance of the judgment, see s 3 of this article. 
25 See Possi 2016 https://africlaw.com/2016/02/01/its-official-the-east-african-court-
of-justice-can-now-adjudicate-human-rights-cases/#more-1048. 
26 Article 24(2) of the EAC Treaty. 
27 Article 24(1) of the EAC Treaty. The criteria for appointing EACJ judges are 
common to almost all international courts. As for the criteria to serve as a judge to 
the EACJ, one has to be: "… [a person] of proven integrity, impartiality and 
independence and who fulfil the conditions required in their own countries for the 
holding of such high judicial office, or who are jurists of recognised competence in 
their respective Partner States". 
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would be to consider having a minimum number instead of a maximum 
number of judges, so as to accommodate any other state coming into the 
EAC. On the administrative side, the EACJ is headed by the President, 
who is also the central figure in the AD. In the Divisions, the President is 
assisted by the Vice President in discharging the duties of the AD, while 
the Principal Judge and the Deputy Principal Judge oversee the FID. 
An international court, like any national judiciary, must be independent and 
impartial, and should be able to rely on rules securing the tenure of its 
judicial officers. Unfortunately, the EAC Treaty does not adequately 
warrant the tenure of its judges. This leads to questions over the EACJ's 
independence and impartiality. A mechanism needs to be put in place with 
regard to the appointment and removal of EACJ judges. At present, as 
already said, the Summit is solely responsible in that regard. Instead, there 
should be an independent body commissioned to appoint and discipline 
judges. It is odd to attempt to rely, in this modern age, on a flimsy rule 
describing one of the grounds leading to the removal of a judge from office 
as being "… inability to perform the functions of the office for any reason 
…".28 A judicial officer cannot and should not be removed from office 
simply for "any reason". Well codified and justifiable grounds should be 
formulated to discipline judges. It should be recalled that the rules 
governing the removal of EACJ judges were given as part of the 
intimidation strategy for the hasty 2007 amendments. The circumstances 
in which the amendments to the Treaty took place suggest that the rules 
were meant to intimidate the then judges. The amended rules have been 
in operation since then.  
Regarding the seat of the EACJ, it is yet to be determined by the Summit. 
The Court has been operating in Arusha, Tanzania, since its inauguration. 
It is housed in a dedicated wing in the multimillion dollar EAC complex. 
Given such massive investment as well as the length of time for which it 
has been operating, there is no genuine reason to move the Court away 
from Arusha. Besides, other organs are permanently stationed in the city. 
Also, moving the EACJ to another site would undercut the whole notion of 
Arusha's being the EAC's and Africa's capital hub for justice.  
The first case received by the Court was Calist Mwatela v EAC,29 in which 
two Community organs engaged in a power struggle. Members of the 
EALA brought the matter to the EACJ, questioning the act of the Council in 
                                            
28 Article 26(b)(i) of the EAC Treaty. 
29 Calist Mwatela v EAC App No 1/2015 (31 October 2007). 
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promulgating fifteen Protocols directly connected to EAC integration issues 
without involving the EALA.30 The case was definitive in establishing the 
extent of the EACJ's authority, as the Court was asked to decide a dispute 
between a legislative and an executive organ of the Community, both of 
which were influential. This case did not touch on the interests of Member 
States directly, which probably made the EACJ sufficiently confident to 
resolve the matter. The institution of the case by EALA members was 
significant, as it acknowledged the existence of the EACJ and recognised 
it as an important forum in which to address integration problems. In a real 
sense, this established a pattern for strengthening the political legitimacy 
of the EACJ.  
The real test of the EACJ's resilience came in the Anyang' Nyong'o case.31 
The applicants successfully challenged the election of nine EALA 
Members from the Kenyan National Assembly.32 The decision of the EACJ 
in this case led to a significant transformation of the nature of the EACJ 
thereafter. Shortly after the Court found Kenya to be in breach of article 50 
of the EAC Treaty, Member States went on to amend the EAC Treaty.33 
The main outcome of the Anyang' Nyong'o case was the disputed EAC 
Treaty amendments.34 The amendments undermined the authority of the 
Court by establishing a two-layer court structure, establishing a time limit 
for the institution of cases, and attacking the security of tenure of the 
judges. The effects of having a time limit and an appellate chamber can 
easily be seen in the current functioning of the EACJ. Comments suggest 
that the 2007 EAC treaty amendments "have significantly affected the 
Court's subsequent trajectory".35 The case was not the only one to be 
brought to the EACJ challenging article 50 of the EAC Treaty.36 
A great deal has happened since the Anyang' Nyong'o case. The EACJ is 
getting busier and its registry docket continues to receive cases touching 
different legal issues. Essentially, there is a sense of growth in the Court's 
stature. The Court has grown in terms of experience. The quality of its 
judgments is fairly steady. However, the Court's human rights jurisdiction 
                                            
30 Article 48 of the EAC Treaty establishes the EALA.  
31 Anyang' Nyong'o v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 1/2006 (29 March 2007). 
32 For a general discussion on this case see Onoria 2010 J Afr L 74-94; Van der Mei 
2009 ZaöRV 410-413. 
33 Van der Mei 2009 ZaöRV 413-418. 
34 See EALS v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2007 (31 August 2008). 
35 Alter, Gathii and Helfer 2016 EJIL 294. 
36 See for example, Komu v Attorney General of Tanzania Ref No 7/2010 (26 
September 2014); Katuntu v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 5/2012 (23 
November 2013). 
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remains problematic and, as will be shown, matters touching on business 
are few and far between. Nevertheless, the importance of the EACJ in the 
EAC integration project is widely accepted. The chief grounds for judging 
the Court to be a success are the strength of its case law. The EACJ 
decisions have provided guidance which has led to a transnational legal 
effect within the region's legal fraternity.  
2.1 Jurisdiction  
After the above overview of the EACJ's institutional architecture, this 
subsection proceeds by reflecting on the scope of the Court's jurisdiction. 
The Court's initial mandate is itself a matter of discussion, particularly as to 
the extent it can preside over the founding principles of the EACJ. Also, as 
shown below, given its jurisdictional scope, the EACJ does not adequately 
play its supervisory role in relation to its Member States, which 
consequently undermines the Court's effectiveness. 
It is fair to say that the EACJ's jurisdiction has been the focal point of 
discussion since its inception. The reason for this is the scope of the 
Court's jurisdiction, which is seen by many to be narrow. The nature of the 
cases adjudicated by the Court so far has mostly had to do with the 
governing principles of the EAC Treaty, particularly those provided under 
articles 6(d) and 7(2). Commercial actors have virtually boycotted the 
EACJ as a result of the Court's early decisions on trade. The long-awaited 
Protocol to extend the Court's jurisdiction was expected to address these 
key issues and hence to improve the Court's functioning. However, as will 
be seen in this article, despite the fact that the newly adopted Protocol has 
emerged after a long period of pressure from EAC citizens that the 
jurisdiction of the EACJ be expanded, the Protocol has really not 
introduced any new feature(s) into its work. As per article 27 of the EAC 
Treaty, the EACJ's jurisdiction is to be expanded in phases.37 The article 
reads as follows:  
1. The Court shall initially have jurisdiction over the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty. 
2. The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and 
other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable 
subsequent date. To this end, the Partner States shall conclude a 
protocol to operationalise the extended jurisdiction. 
The above provision implies that appellate functions, and human rights 
and any other areas of jurisdiction could be expanded upon the adoption 
                                            
37 Ojienda 2004 EAJHRD 95. 
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of a new Protocol. The provision also holds out the possibility of expanding 
the "original" mandate of the Court. On 20 February 2015 the Summit 
endorsed the Protocol for expanding the EACJ's jurisdiction pursuant to 
article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty. The Protocol claims that when it enters 
into force it will expand the Court's already existing jurisdiction in trade and 
investment matters, arising out of the implementation of the Customs 
Union, the Common Market and the Monitory Union Protocols.38 The 
Protocol awaits ratification, which was directed to be finalised by 30 
November 2015.39 At the time of the preparation of this article, Rwanda is 
the only Member State that has ratified the Protocol. It is submitted that 
the new Protocol does not present new features in the work of the Court. It 
was expected that it would at least expand the original mandate, even if 
only by allowing the EACJ to interpret the domestic laws of the Member 
States. 
The EACJ already had jurisdiction in interpreting trade and investment 
issues arising from the Customs Union and Common Market Protocols. 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty can 
be "… in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments …".40 
EAC protocols are "related instruments" to the EAC Treaty and are within 
the range of the EACJ's jurisdictional mandate. This interpretation is also 
supported by article 151(4) of the EAC Treaty. The provision establishes 
that protocols constitute an integral part of the Treaty. The EACJ 
consolidated this position in EALS v Secretary General of the EAC.41 In 
this case the parties contested over the EACJ's jurisdiction in interpreting 
the Customs Union and the Common Market Protocols. The EACJ 
reaffirmed its supremacy by holding that it does not require an extension of 
its jurisdiction as provided by article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty to exercise 
jurisdiction over the two Protocols. In the same fashion, the Court should 
preside in any matter arising out of the Monetary Union Protocol. 
Clearly, the new Protocol has not received widespread support from the 
stakeholders in the region. Little about it has been disseminated. The 
EACJ itself is not taking the lead in informing the public about the 
significance of the new Protocol. Most likely, the content in the Protocol 
makes uninteresting, as it does not contain any new feature(s). The new 
                                            
38 Article 3(1) of the Protocol to Operationalise the Extended Jurisdiction of the East 
African Court of Justice (2015) (the EACJ Protocol).  
39 Mwanza 2015 https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7126-the-eac-court-s-
jurisdiction-over-investment-matters-and-what-it-means-for-the-community-s-legal-
instruments.html. 
40 Article 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
41 EALS v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 1/2011 (14 January 2013) 21-23.  
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Protocol is not what civil society and activists across the region had been 
campaigning for, including the Court itself. The first few years of the 
EACJ's existence were characterised by numerous workshops and 
meetings with the purpose of inducing the Member States to conclude a 
protocol to grant authority in matters pertaining to human rights to the 
EACJ and its appellate division.42 
Strategic litigation was deployed in a couple of instances to push for the 
extension of the Court's jurisdiction. The first attempt was made in 2010, 
when a concerned citizen of the EAC, Mr Sebalu, sought for a speedy 
determination of the Zero Draft Protocol that would make the EACJ have 
an appellate as well as a human rights mandate, as provided under article 
27(2) of the EAC Treaty.43 Inspired by the former EACA, Mr Sebalu 
approached the EACJ after losing an election petition at the Court of 
Appeal in Uganda, where he could not seek further legal remedy of 
appeal. Knowing that the EACJ does not have an appellate jurisdiction, 
Sebalu asked it to make a declaration that the delay in expanding the 
jurisdiction of the EACJ to appellate jurisdiction was contrary to the 
principles of good governance and the rule of law, to which EAC member 
states had bound themselves.44 
Being aware of the delay, the Court stated that the prolonged process was 
a breach of the Community's principle of good governance.45 Shortly after, 
Mr Sebalu sought for the Court's assistance on the topic of compliance 
with the decision, after the Council of Ministers adopted a zero draft of the 
then envisaged Protocol different from the one that had given the EACJ 
the jurisdiction in human rights as well as an appellate court.46 Eventually 
the EACJ found that non-compliance with the decision of the first Sebalu 
case was contrary to the founding principles of the EACJ.47 
The adoption of the new Protocol has a history of its own. In 2004 Member 
States came up with a Zero Draft Protocol for extending the jurisdiction of 
the EACJ that initially provided for a human rights and appellate mandate 
for the EACJ.48 The so-called Zero Draft Protocol did not get far. Member 
States expressed their discontent about the EACJ's having an appellate 
and human rights mandate. Subsequently, a new version of the Protocol 
                                            
42 Ruhangisa 2011 http://eacj.org/2014/docs/EACJ-Ten-Years-of-Operation.pdf 26. 
43 Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 1/2010 (30 July 2011) 1-3. 
44 Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 1/2010 (30 July 2011). 
45 Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 1/2010 (30 July 2011) 42.  
46 Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 8/2012 (22 November 2013). 
47 Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 8/2012 (22 November 2013) 38. 
48 Bossa 2006 EAJHD 31. 
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was prepared and presented before the Sectoral Council on Legal and 
Judicial Affairs. The decision to come up with this Protocol was reached in 
2013, when the Summit approved the Council's recommendation to extend 
the EACJ jurisdiction in trade and investment issues only, leaving human 
rights issues to the AU and national institutions.49 Article 27(2) of the EAC 
Treaty gives the Council discretion to determine the scope of EACJ 
jurisdiction as it deems necessary at a particular time. The Council is not 
compelled to give the EAC human rights or an appellate jurisdiction. As 
such, the latest Protocol can be used by Member States as a shield from 
the series of Sebalu cases. However, the Council was expected to develop 
a more enterprising protocol than the one recently adopted. It was 
expected that the new Protocol would address longstanding challenges 
facing the EACJ such as the security of tenure of the court judges, the 
admissibility requirements, and the challenges in enforcing the Court's 
judgment. In adopting this Protocol, the EAC States have missed an 
opportunity to improve the functioning of the EACJ. 
Looking at other forms of EACJ jurisdiction, they are clear and more 
progressive. Like most other contemporary international courts, the EACJ 
has gone beyond the old model of international judicial bodies, which were 
primarily created to settle disputes between states.50 A number of key 
players can subscribe to the Court for remedies. The EACJ can adjudicate 
cases referred by Member States when other Member States or organs or 
institutions of the Community fail to meet the obligations provided by the 
EAC Treaty.51 The Secretary General may also refer to the EACJ a 
Member State's contravention of the EAC Treaty.52 The Secretary General 
can make such a reference only after consulting with the defaulting state 
and the Council, as provided by article 29 of the EAC Treaty. Significantly, 
natural and legal persons can access the EACJ.53 Individuals are entitled 
to question the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action 
of a Member State or an institution which goes contrary to the EAC 
Treaty.54 Individuals also need not demonstrate specific interest when 
instituting a case.55 
                                            
49 EAC 2013 http://repository.eac.int/handle/11671/546 16. 
50 There is, however, a retreat in some of the REC courts, such as the SADC 
Tribunal, which has a Protocol restricting individual access and deals with disputes 
involving states only. See Jonas 2013 IHRLR 294-321.  
51 Article 28(1) of the EAC Treaty.  
52 Article 29 of the EAC Treaty.  
53 Article 30 of the EAC Treaty. 
54 Article 9 of the EAC Treaty distinguishes organs and institutions of the EAC. As per 
art 9(1), the organs of the EAC are: the Summit, the Council, the Co-ordination 
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Individuals are able to seek the services of the EACJ like any other 
subjects of the Court. However, article 30 does not allow individuals to 
challenge acts of the EAC organs, which is yet another example of how 
the EACJ's jurisdiction is circumscribed. Apart from dealing with 
individuals, the EACJ can handle matters of dispute between the 
Community and its employees,56 matters originating from an arbitration 
clause agreement, and special agreements binding the disputing parties 
where there is a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Court.57 In ensuring 
consistency in interpreting the EAC Treaty, the EACJ makes preliminary 
rulings when a matter of concern appears before a national judicial body. 
When faced with a question regarding an interpretation of the EAC Treaty, 
a national court may refer the matter to the EACJ for interpretation.58 This 
requirement is discretional. Also, the EACJ can give an advisory opinion 
upon being requested by the Summit, the Council or a Member State 
whenever there is a question of law arising from the EAC Treaty.59 
Advisory opinions are determined by the AD of the Court.60 
In ensuring that the EAC integration becomes a reality, the Court's role is 
key. It is the Court's stripped mandate of ensuring compliance to the EAC 
Treaty that will drive EAC integration forward. The Court is expected to 
effectively assert its authority in all matters concerning EAC integration, 
without limitations.  
Notwithstanding the fact that its importance is now accepted, there remain 
genuine concerns about its role and some of the challenges that it has had 
to face from time to time. For instance, while individuals enjoy "direct 
                                                                                                                       
Committee, the Sectoral Committees, the EACJ, the EALA, the Secretariat; and 
such other organs as may be established by the Summit. Under art 9(3), 
institutions of the Community shall include: "… the East African Development Bank 
established by the Treaty Amending and Re-enacting the Charter of the East 
African Development Bank, 1980 and the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation 
established by the Convention (Final Act) for the Establishment of the Lake Victoria 
Fisheries Organisation, 1994 and surviving institutions of the former East African 
Community shall be deemed to be institutions of the Community and shall be 
designated and function as such". Also see Modern Holdings (EA) Limited v Kenya 
Ports Authority Ref No 1/2008 (11 February 2009). 
55 Van der Mei 2009 ZaöRV 429. 
56 Article 31 of the EAC Treaty.  
57 Article 32 of the EAC Treaty. See Alice Nayebare v EALS Arbitration Cause No 
1/2012. 
58 Article 34 of the EAC Treaty.  
59 Article 36 of the EAC Treaty. Also see Matter of a Request by the Council of 
Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory Opinion Opinion No 1/2008; Matter of a 
Request by the Council of Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory Opinion Opinion No 
1/2015. 
60 Rule 75(4) of the East African Court of Justice Rules of Procedure (2013). 
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access" to the Court, the issue of the time limitation for filing a case is still 
a matter of discontent.  
2.2 The draconian two-month rule: An obstacle to accessing justice 
Article 30(2) of the EAC Treaty requires complaints to be filed before the 
EACJ within two months of the enactment, publication, directive, decision 
or action that contravenes the EAC law, or of the day on which a particular 
breach has come to the knowledge of the complainant.61 The provision is 
exclusively intended to restrict applications brought by individuals. Other 
organs and institutions with locus to the Court are not bound by article 
30(2). While the insertion of article 30 is seen as a progressive step 
towards permitting individuals to have direct access to the EACJ, the time 
limit imposed under article 30(2) is radical and is an attempt to discourage 
individuals from accessing the Court. The EACJ, in particular the AD, is 
conservative in interpreting the two-month rule. The leading case on the 
rule is Attorney General of Uganda v Omar Awadh.62 In this case the 
EACJ took the position that the strict application of the two-month rule is 
necessary for the purpose of legal certainty. The AD established that it 
could not uphold the principle of continuing violation since it is a human 
rights principle, and the Court does not have the jurisdiction to deal with 
human rights cases.63 The AD narrowly associated the continuing violation 
doctrine with human rights alone, while the doctrine can be supported 
whenever there is a breach of the rule of law, such as in the matter of 
unlawful detention. 
The strict application of article 30(2) is causing many references to fail 
before their merits are considered because they exceed the time limit.64 In 
the case of continuing violations such as enforced disappearances and 
arbitrary detention, the EACJ has rejected requests to extend the time for 
submitting a claim, contrary to what is provided under Rule 4 of the EACJ 
Rules.65 Without concrete reasoning, the EACJ defends itself by claiming 
                                            
61 Article 30(2) of the EAC Treaty. 
62 Attorney General of Uganda v Omar Awadh Appeal No 2/2012 (15 April 2013) para 
51.  
63 Attorney General of Uganda v Omar Awadh Appeal No 2/2012 (15 April 2013) para 
52. 
64 For example, Mureithi Wa Nyambura v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 
11/2011 (24 February 2014); Ndayizamba v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 
3/2012 (28 March 2014); Ruhara v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 4/2014 (7 
August 2015). 
65 IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2010 (29 June 2011); Appeal No 
1/2011 (15 March 2012); Mureithi Wa Nyambura v Attorney General of Uganda Ref 
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that the Treaty does not empower it to stretch the two-month time limit. 
This is what the EACJ takes as a precedent when declining to uphold the 
continuing violation doctrine: 
… nowhere does the Treaty provide any power to the Court to extend, to 
condone, to waive, or to modify the prescribed time limit for any reason 
(including for "continuing violations").66 
The current position of the EACJ is contrary to the spirit of the EAC Treaty 
pertaining to sustaining the rule of law and social justice. The two-month 
period applies only after a complainant becomes aware of the alleged 
violations.67 The period for the applicant to acquire knowledge is not 
limited, and the grace period "can be as long as it takes for the 
complainant to be possessed of the requisite knowledge".68 
In early cases where the time limit was in contention, the FID condoned 
the applications of applicants who filed their cases well beyond the two-
month window. In IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya,69 a reference filed in 
2010, the applicant took Kenya to the EACJ concerning the violence that 
took place in Mount Elgon between 2006 and 2008 in the aftermath of the 
election. The applicant accused the government of Kenya of failing to take 
any administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent or punish the 
perpetrators. The allegations made were framed to preserve the rule of 
law, good governance and justice, which are not disqualified by a statutory 
limit.70 The respondent disputed the admissibility of the case, arguing that 
the case had been submitted outside the two-month limitation period as 
provided under article 30(2) of the Treaty. After considering the arguments 
of both parties, the FID stated the following: 
It is our considered view, that the matters complained of are failures in a 
whole continuous chain of events from when the alleged violations started 
until the Claimant decided that the Republic of Kenya had failed to provide 
any remedy for the alleged violations. We find that such action or omission of 
a Partner State cannot be limited by mathematical computation of time.71 
Being dissatisfied with the ruling of the FID, the Attorney General of Kenya 
filed an appeal, where his main argument was that the case was time-
                                                                                                                       
No 11/2011 (24 February 2014); Francois v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 
8/2011 (28 February 2014). 
66 Attorney General of Uganda v Omar Awadh Appeal No 2/2012 (15 April 2013) para 
59. 
67 IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Appeal No 1/2011 (15 March 2012) 16. 
68 IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Appeal No 1/2011 (15 March 2012) 16. 
69 IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2010 (29 June 2011). 
70 IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2010 (29 June 2011) 9. 
71 IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2010 (29 June 2011) 10. 
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barred as provided for under article 30(2) of the EAC Treaty. The AD 
overruled the previous reasoning and struck out the reference by 
holding:72 
The Court below could not rule otherwise on the face of the explicit limitation 
in article 9(4) to the effect that the Court must act within the limits of its 
powers under the Treaty. It follows, therefore, in our view, that this Court is 
limited by article 30(2) to hear References only filed within two months from 
the date of action or decision complained of, or the date the Claimant 
became aware of it … there is no enabling provision in the Treaty to 
disregard the time limit set by article 30(2). Moreover, that article does not 
recognize any continuing breach or violation of the Treaty outside the two 
months after a relevant action comes to the knowledge of the Claimant; nor 
is there any power to extend that time limit … The reason for this short time 
limit is critical – it is to ensure legal certainty among the diverse membership 
of the Community. 
The AD observed that the matter was time-barred, as the respondents had 
become aware of the violations through various widely publicised reports 
between 2006 and 2009, while the Reference was filed in 2010. The Court 
stressed that article 30(2) of the EAC Treaty should be interpreted in terms 
of its literal meaning and that the provision did not make any express 
provision for the concept of continuing violations. The Court was also of 
the view that it had no powers to extend the two-month period stipulated 
under the Treaty, as its powers were limited by article 9(4). 
Another case was Rugumba v Attorney General of Rwanda.73 The 
applicant accused the Government of Rwanda of impugning the founding 
principles provided in the EAC Treaty by unlawfully arresting and detaining 
one Seveline Rugiga Ngabo from 20 August 2010 to 28 January 2011. 
The applicant further asserted that while the reference was filed on 8 
November 2010, the detention of Seveline Rugiga Ngabo lasted up until 
28 January 2011, and therefore, since the detention was continuous, the 
time limitation clause imposed under article 30(2) of the EAC Treaty could 
not be invoked.74 The FID upheld its previous decision in the IMLU case 
by stating that: 
… [W]here issues in contest are criminal in nature and the action complained 
of is continuous (such as detention), it would be against the principles known 
to the rule of law to dismiss the complaint on the basis of strict mathematical 
computation of time.75 
                                            
72 IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Appeal No 1/2011 (15 March 2012) 16. 
73 Rugumba v Attorney General of Rwanda Ref No 8/2010 (30 November 2011). 
74 Rugumba v Attorney General of Rwanda Ref No 8/2010 (30 November 2011) 11. 
75 Rugumba v Attorney General of Rwanda Ref No 8/2010 (30 November 2011) 28. 
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The Court also held that the applicant had filed the application within time. 
The decision was later reaffirmed by the AD but not on the basis of the 
continuation of events rule. The AD found that the applicant acquired 
knowledge of the matter alleged within two months of the claim being 
brought to the Court. By strictly applying the two-month rule, the EACJ had 
disregarded its own jurisprudence in the EALS v Attorney General of 
Kenya case,76 when it called for a purposeful interpretation approach to 
the EAC Treaty as opposed to a restrictive and literal approach. It is 
submitted that article 9(4) of the EAC Treaty does not prevent the Court 
from adopting a purposeful interpretation of the Treaty. Also, the Court 
could have invoked its inherent powers so as to promote justice, which it 
did not opt to do. 
As it stands, the two-month rule prevails and is strictly applied by the 
EACJ, which in the end restricts the Court's supervisory role in matters 
which might have significant interest in the EAC. Further, the Omar Awadh 
decision has served and will continue to be a point of reference in future 
cases. The rule is a persisting hurdle to litigants. The EACJ can still adopt 
the continuing violation doctrine, courtesy of Rules 1 and 4. The former 
establishes the inherent power that the EACJ has, and the latter enables 
the Court to extend the time of proceedings. 
The challenge to the legality of article 30(2) could easily be anticipated. In 
Steven Dennis v Attorney General of Burundi77 the applicant, who had 
been unable to challenge his expulsion from Tanzania to Rwanda, 
resorted to challenging the sixty days' time limit in filing a case before the 
EACJ. The applicant was of the view that article 30(2) denies individuals 
access to justice and is contrary to the principles under articles 6 and 7 of 
the EAC Treaty. The FID declined to accept that the sixty days rule 
contradicted EAC principles yet also paradoxically advised that the matter 
should be brought to the attention of Member States, as the rule was 
contrary to the people-centred and market-driven cooperation as provided 
under article 7(1)(a) of the EAC Treaty.78 
It is argued that article 30(2) should be interpreted on the basis of its 
original purpose. The following are reasons for saying so. 
                                            
76 EALS v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2007 (31 August 2008). 
77 Steven Dennis v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 3/2015 (31 March 2017). 
78 Steven Dennis v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 3/2015 (31 March 2017) 29-
30. 
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First, before the flawed 2007 Treaty amendment, the absence of article 
30(2) allowed private litigants to play their roles in EAC integration without 
restriction. In fact, the provision as it stands is discriminatory, as it is 
applicable only to private litigants and not to others who can access the 
EACJ, such as the EAC Secretary General.  
Second, private litigants are key in spearheading the goal of integration 
through litigating on matters directly associated with integration. The strict 
application of article 30(2) ensures that private litigants will not easily 
access the EACJ, eventually denying them access to justice. In a society 
such as that of the EAC, where most indigents are illiterate and legal 
services are scarce, a time-window of sixty days is minute. One could take 
about six months and more to gather evidence, while jotting-down 
pleadings and seeking legal assistance, even if one were aware of the 
applicable legal procedures or even of the existence of an integration court 
such as the EACJ.  
Third, since its inception the Court has failed to attract traders due to the 
shortcomings in its remedial powers and other related pitfalls. As long as 
there is only a two months' period in which a complaint may be lodged 
before an integration court, traders in the region will keep on boycotting 
the Court and find other more favorable avenues of redress. Thus, by 
literally interpreting article 30(2) the Court makes it highly unlikely that 
traders will bring their commercial disputes forward for resolution. The 
liberal interpretation of the provision might attract such litigants in the 
region. 
2.3 Judgments, compliance and execution 
The most generic challenge faced by many international courts is the level 
of obedience by their member states. The EACJ is not an exception to this 
general observation. Essentially, international courts are influential only 
when their decisions are easily complied with and executed by states. If 
not, as with the case of the EACJ, then, such an international court will 
always be on the brink of being toothless and ineffective.  
At the end of each reference, the EACJ delivers a judgment. It also issues 
interim orders carrying a status similar to that of a court judgment.79 
Member States as well as the Council are bound to implement EACJ 
judgments without delay.80 But there are no established mechanisms to 
                                            
79 Article 39 of the EAC Treaty.  
80 Article 38(3) of the EAC Treaty.  
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ensure compliance in the event that a state refuses to implement a 
decision. Since 2005 the EACJ has dealt with more than 190 matters. 
What is intriguing in those judgments is tracking the extent to which they 
have been met with compliance. Member States have not been 
sanctioned when they have failed to comply with the EACJ's decisions. It 
is a matter of fact that the nature of EACJ judgments is declaratory, and 
this tends to attract non-compliance. The best the Court can offer is to 
declare violations of the law, give orders for injunctive relief, and award 
costs to the successful applicants.81 The costs order depends on the 
nature of the case. Public interest cases do not attract costs orders. 
The EACJ does not offer damages or compensation. Declining to award 
damages discourages litigants from the commercial sector. There is no 
excuse for EACJ to keep acknowledging its inability to award damages 
without doing anything about it. There is no provision in the Treaty 
explicitly permitting or not permitting the EACJ to award 
damages/compensation, but it has opted not to award any damages. In 
contrast, it awards damages in employment cases.82 
Perhaps it is too critical of the Court to say that it missed an opportunity in 
the process of adopting the new Protocol. The EACJ seem to be 
contented with its inability to award damages, and also with its lack of 
enforcement mechanisms. This critique is based particularly on the cases 
in which applicants genuinely sought damages. The Court sees such 
cases as not being tortious or contractual in nature, and hence does not 
award damages.83 In the Sebalu case84 the EACJ stated that:  
The EACJ is a legitimate avenue through which to seek redress, even if all 
the Court does is to make declarations of illegality of the impugned acts, 
whether of commission or omission. 
While the EACJ claims to be disabled from awarding damages, the EAC 
Treaty provides a means of executing a pecuniary judgment against an 
individual.85 The provision assumes that the Court awards damages. If the 
Court imposes a pecuniary obligation, the judgment holder has to follow 
the laws of the civil procedure of the state where the execution is to take 
place. In essence, the Treaty does not provide the means of enforcing the 
                                            
81 Ndorimana v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 2/2013 (28 November 2014). 
82 Amudo v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 4/2014 (30 July 2015). 
83 Kahoho v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 2/2013 (9 November 2015) 
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Court's judgment when a state is in breach of the EAC Treaty. The Treaty 
does not recognise individuals (such as EAC employees) as offenders or 
as being respondent parties in a case. It is only states and EAC organs 
and institutions that qualify as such. The provision for enabling claims of 
pecuniary obligation against individuals in the EAC Treaty is therefore 
redundant.  
Little is known about the extent of compliance with the EACJ's decisions. 
One could correctly characterise the EACJ's decisions as being academic. 
But the EACJ is essential for the survival of the EAC, and the efficiency of 
the EAC Treaty depends on the EACJ's effectiveness. Without effective 
enforcement mechanisms, the EACJ will have little impact on the 
Community. The challenges encountered when enforcing the decisions of 
the EACJ might be caused by problems that involve some of the most 
delicate aspects of international law: that is, states' ignorance in 
responding to international law. 
The enforcement of a judgment of a court is an important stage in any 
litigation process. When a court judgment is enforced, that marks the end 
of a dispute. A dispute does not end merely with a court judgment. When a 
court judgment is finally executed, the execution saves the court from the 
embarrassment of having merely issued a written judgment. The 
successful execution of a judgment is the result that any litigant would 
seek and, in respect of the judgments that the EACJ has delivered so far, 
there has been only one complaint of non-compliance, which was in the 
Sebalu case described above. It is within the Office of the Secretary 
General that compliance with EACJ decisions should be tracked. In all 
fairness, the Office is seen to underperform in this respect. Admittedly it is 
very much occupied with the overall supervision of the wellbeing of the 
Community. Giving it the task of tracking compliance with EACJ judgments 
would be to overwhelm it with work. 
Having most of the EACJ's judgment delivered in a declaratory form will 
certainly not induce Member States to fear noncompliance. That is why the 
EACJ is struggling to stamp its authority on the region.  
3 Disputes determined by the EACJ 
This section identifies the nature of the cases that have most frequently 
featured before the EACJ, and the manner in which they have been dealt 
with by the Court. In the process of doing this, the legal challenges 
associated with the Court's functioning and effectiveness are identified.  
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 21 
Cases involving the principles of the Treaty, particularly those touching on 
human rights, the rule of law and good governance have been prominent 
in the EACJ. A very minimal role has been played by cases featuring 
issues of trade, the customs union and the common market. Notably, the 
aspects chosen are not the only subjects of disputes adjudicated by the 
EACJ. As stated at the beginning of this article, EACJ has been engaged 
in different issues in its quest to strengthen the EAC project in the exercise 
of its adjudicative powers.  
When one looks at the objectives of the EAC one realises that the 
perception that RECs are institutions focused on economic issues only 
should be reconsidered. The EAC Treaty, for example, has expansive 
objectives. The Treaty establishes a customs union, a common market, 
subsequently a monetary union, and ultimately a political federation with a 
diverse range of objectives, as indicated above.86 The process of 
achieving the targeted goals will always be accompanied by different kinds 
of disputes. When that happens, REC courts such as the EACJ come into 
play by resolving the disputes and clearing the way for a smooth 
integration process. Issues of upholding Community principles, free 
movement and trade have been chosen as topics for discussion in 
reflecting below on the role of the EACJ in advancing EAC integration. 
Given the broad scope of the EAC objectives, it is unlikely that the Court 
will deal with the following issues only. 
3.1 Community principles 
The principles of the Community are declared in the EAC Treaty. They 
have been the basis for the cause of action against Member States in all 
cases submitted to the EACJ so far. To that effect, the EACJ has upheld 
the Community principles within fair margins. Contrary to the expectations 
of its architects, over time the EACJ has robustly been able to hold 
Member States responsible for violating the EAC Treaty. The decision 
portal section of the EACJ's website reveals that most of the Court's 
decisions concern Community principles, particularly those mentioned 
under articles 6 and 7 of the EAC Treaty. The principles most frequently in 
consideration are the rule of law, good governance and human rights. 
Litigants, practitioners and civil society have been pressing for the EACJ to 
have a human rights mandate for quite some time. It must be 
acknowledged that the Court has to a degree arrogated to itself the role of 
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being a human rights protector. In the DP case87 the EACJ stated as 
follows: 
The wording '…in accordance with the provisions of the [ACHPR]', creates 
an obligation on the EAC Partner States to act in good faith and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Failure to do so constitutes an 
infringement of the Treaty. Such violation can be legally challenged before 
the [EACJ] by virtue of its jurisdiction ... Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty 
empower the [EACJ] to apply the provisions of the Charter, the Vienna 
Convention, as well as any other relevant international instrument to ensure 
the Partner States' observance of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as 
those of other international instruments to which the Treaty makes reference. 
The role of the Court in the instant Reference, was to ascertain the Partner 
States' adherence to, observance of, and/or compliance with the Treaty 
provisions – including the provisions of any other international instruments 
which are incorporated in the Treaty, whether explicitly [as in Article 6(d)], or 
implicitly [as in Article 7(2)]. 
The above decision is the most recent in which the EACJ has in a real 
sense made a declaration on a human rights violation. The decision came 
from the AD of the Court, which had previously been reluctant to adopt a 
more straightforward approach to interpreting the human rights norms 
provided in the EAC Treaty. However, little has been heard from human 
rights stakeholders in celebration of this latest decision. Hopefully, this is 
not a sign that the public has lost interest in the EACJ. EACJ judges and 
the Office of the Registrar were instrumental in advocating that the Court 
be given an explicit human rights jurisdiction.88 This advocacy has recently 
become less vocal. The reason for this may be the change in the person of 
the Registrar, the officer responsible for the administration of the Court. It 
is through the Office of the Registrar that all outreach programmes 
conducted by the Court are administered. Presumably the new Registrar 
does not strive for the adoption of a human rights approach. 
Since the EACJ's inception, the Court's human rights role has been a 
subject of debate as to whether it is mandated to adjudicate human rights 
disputes.89 This is caused by article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty, which seems 
to expressly limit the EACJ to adjudicating human rights cases until a 
protocol to that effect is adopted. Uncertainty about the Court's human 
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rights role was clear from the early days of its operations. A clear 
illustration of the cloud of ambiguity surrounding the EACJ's human rights 
jurisdiction appeared in Katabazi v Uganda,90 when the Court held:  
While the Court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights 
disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation 
under Article 27(1) merely because the reference [before the Court] includes 
allegation[s] of human rights violation.91 
[T]he intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the 
execution of a lawful Court order violated the principle of the rule of law and 
consequently contravened the Treaty. Abiding by the court decision is the 
comer stone of the independence of the judiciary which is one of the 
principles of the observation of the rule of law.92 
The above statements by the EACJ seem not to have been clearly 
understood by many litigants. It has been taken for granted that the EACJ 
can hold states accountable for human rights violations, even when it lacks 
an explicit mandate to that effect. Looking closely at the decision, it was 
not crafted on the basis of human rights. Nevertheless, post-Katabazi 
cases submitted to the EACJ have opened the floodgates to human rights 
allegations against Member States. 
Prior to the DP case the position of the EACJ, specifically the AD, was that 
the Court would adjudicate on a matter containing human rights allegation 
only if the application contained a cause of action distinct from human 
rights.93 Such a cause of action could be the rule of law, democracy, or 
good governance. Notwithstanding the precedent in the DP case, the 
EACJ still lacks an explicit human rights authority. The decision alone 
cannot justify the EACJ's receiving and deciding human rights cases, as 
the Treaty does not allow the Court to do so. The DP decision comes from 
the wisdom of the judges and not from clearly provided letters of the law. 
A digest of human rights-like decisions of the EACJ may give the 
impression that the EACJ is adopting a judicial law-making strategy in 
adjudicating human rights matters. This could on the one hand be 
celebrated by regional human rights activists, while on the other hand it 
might undermine the Court's legitimacy, particularly in the opinion of the 
prescribing Member States. When courts expand their mandate beyond 
what is prescribed, concerns of legitimacy arise.94 Distinctive academics 
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such as Gathii describe the EACJ as "an important human rights court".95 
There is a tendency of sub-regional courts to involve themselves in 
adjudicating human rights, the rule of law and good governance principles, 
but amongst them all the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of 
the West Africa is the only REC Court that does not enjoy the privilege of 
having a clear human rights mandate.96 The Protocol that ought to give the 
EACJ an explicit human rights jurisdiction is limited to trade issues only.97 
The other sub-regional court, the Southern African development 
Community Tribunal, which was purposed to uphold the norms of the 
Southern African Development Community Treaty, has literally been 
abandoned.98 It is therefore conceded that article 27(2) provides an 
indication that the EACJ's human rights jurisdiction was not meant by 
Member States to feature in the current scope of the Court's mandate. The 
EACJ, therefore, cannot be classified as a human rights court. 
In 2012, there was a glimmer of hope for human rights activists in the 
region, when the EALA passed a Human Rights Bill.99 The aim of the Bill 
was to end the ambiguity surrounding article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty, by 
giving effect to human rights norms in the Treaty. It is unknown whether 
the Bill was submitted to the Heads of State as directed under article 62(2) 
of the EAC Treaty. There is little information about the current status of 
Bill. Most likely, the EAC Treaty's provisions on how such matters are to 
be taken forward are being ignored, for the following reasons. Member 
States have the liberty to assent to or withhold assent to a Bill passed by 
the EALA,100 subject to the prescribed procedures. As indicated above, it 
is mandatory for the EALA Speaker to submit any passed bill to the Heads 
of State. Bills should be approved by Heads of State within three months 
                                            
95 Gathii 2013 Duke J Comp & Int'l L 250. 
96 Article 3(4) of the Supplementary Protocol Amending Protocol Relating to the 
Community Court of Justice (2005). For an understanding of the ECOWAS Court 
and its human rights jurisdiction see Alter, Helfer and McAllister 2013 AJIL 737-
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97 See the Protocol to Operationalise the Extended Jurisdiction of the East African 
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of being passed by the EALA.101 If it is not, the bill should be referred back 
to the EALA for reconsideration, accompanied with reasons for its 
rejection. Then the Assembly will re-consider and re-submit the bill to the 
Heads of State for approval.102 At this point, if any Member State declines 
to assent to the re-submitted bill, then the bill lapses.103 None of these 
steps were followed after the Human Rights Bill was adopted by the EALA. 
This constitutes an infringement of the EAC Treaty. It is likely that the 
EALA was not dancing to the same tune as the EAC Heads of State on 
the issue of human rights. It is clear that if the Bill were to succeed, the 
EACJ would automatically have found itself to have no option but to 
adjudicate on human rights matters. 
Evolution towards a strong EAC depends on adherence to the rule of law, 
good governance, and the principles of democracy and human rights. 
Proponents of a human rights mandate for the EACJ would argue that the 
Court is fully entitled to adjudicate human rights in accordance with articles 
23 and 27 of the Treaty. Views that progressive EAC integration will 
depend on the realisation of human rights could also be advanced in 
support of an EAC human rights jurisdiction. It is commonly acknowledged 
that the protection of fundamental rights is an indispensable element of the 
modern international system. However, the EACJ lacks the necessary 
features to be a human rights protector. Nevertheless, the reality is that 
the Court seems to be unable to resist receiving cases which contain 
human rights allegations, as long as the provisions of the Treaty are 
enriched with human rights obligations.104 
Apart from the principles of human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance, the EACJ has settled disputes concerning other principles 
linked with the EAC integration process, including the principles of variable 
geometry and subsidiarity. The principle of variable geometry allows 
member states in an integration bloc to implement integration projects at a 
different pace among themselves. States within an integration 
arrangement are allowed to move forward with integration activities, while 
leaving others to join later. As with the principle of subsidiarity, the EAC 
Treaty fails to clearly define the scope and applicability of the principle of 
                                            
101 Article 63(2) of the EAC Treaty. 
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104 For instance, in one of the latest cases determined by the EACJ, Burundi's media 
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Burundi Journalists Union v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 7/2013 (15 May 
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variable geometry. The Treaty recognises the principle as a policy tool of 
"... flexibility which allows for progression in co-operation among a sub-
group of members in a larger integration scheme in a variety of areas and 
at different speeds".105 On a quick reading of the Treaty, the principle 
clashes with the requirement of consensus in the decision-making process 
within the Summit106 and the Council of Ministers.107 This was evident 
when the Council of Ministers approached the EACJ to seek clarity on the 
scope of the application of the variable geometry principle within the 
EAC.108 
It was clear that even the top officials of the Community could not grasp 
the nature and scope of one of the founding principles of the Community, 
a principle derived from their own wisdom. In the quest for an advisory 
opinion, the EACJ was in general called upon to clarify the application of 
the principle of variable geometry vis-à-vis the requirement of consensus 
in the decision-making process of the EAC. The Court was of the view 
that, if diligently applied, the principle of variable geometry is in harmony 
with consensus, when deliberating on integration decisions.109 In clarifying, 
the EACJ had this to say:110 
The Court finds that the principle of variable geometry, as its definition 
suggests, is a strategy of implementation of Community decisions and not a 
decision-making tool in itself. [...] The Court is of the opinion, therefore, that 
the principle of variable geometry can comfortably apply, and was intended, 
to guide the integration process and we find no reason or possibility for it to 
conflict with the requirement for consensus in decision-making. 
3.2 Free movement of persons  
Freedom of movement in the common market stage of integration is a 
"hybrid legal right" which is a "central pillar of all regional integration 
                                            
105 Article 1 of the EAC Treaty. The variable geometry principle is also described 
under art 7(1)(e) of the EAC Treaty as "... the Principle of variable geometry which 
allows for progression in co-operation among groups within the Community for 
wider integration schemes in various fields and at different speeds". 
106 Article 12(3) of the EAC Treaty. 
107 Article 15(4) of the EAC Treaty. Further, art 2(2) of the Protocol on Decision 
Making by the Council of the East African Community (2001) provides that the 
decision of the Council is by simple majority, without disclosing the kinds of 
decisions to be reached by a simple majority. 
108 Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory Opinion 
Opinion No 1/2008. 
109 Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory Opinion 
Opinion No 1/2008 29. 
110 Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory Opinion 
Opinion No 1/2008 33. 
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systems".111 Both the EAC Treaty and the EAC Common Market Protocol 
provide for the right to the freedom of movement of persons.112 While from 
one point of view the free movement of persons is treated as a scheme for 
bolstering trade between nations, from another the effective 
implementation of the policy reflects full citizenship within an integration 
scheme. The ultimate goal of the EAC is to attain political federation, an 
apex stage of integration that requires the full implementation of the free 
movement policy.113 The Common Market Protocol requires Member 
States to guarantee the entry and exit of EAC citizens without a visa. A 
citizen from one EAC country can enter and stay in another EAC country 
for a renewable period of six months.114 The only exception is that 
individuals may be denied entry on security, health and policy grounds.115 
In addition, any entry restriction imposed on an individual by a state should 
be communicated to the previously exited state.116 
The EACJ has dealt with three matters so far on the right to free 
movement.117 The leading precedent out of the three cases is the Mohochi 
case.118 Samwel Mohochi, a Kenyan lawyer and human rights activist, 
arrived at Entebbe Airport in April 2011 as part of a team from the Kenyan 
chapter of the International Commission of Jurists. Airport immigration 
officials permitted the rest of the team to enter, but not Mohochi, who was 
refused entry to Uganda. The officials detained Mohochi for some hours 
and then placed him on an airplane returning him to Kenya, after sending 
Kenya Airways a "Notice to Return or Convey Prohibited Immigrant". 
Mohochi was never informed of the reasons for his being denied entrance 
into Uganda, if any.119 Mohochi turned to the EACJ, accusing Uganda of 
being in violation of the right to free movement as provided by the EAC 
Treaty,120 in particular the Common Market Protocol.121 In addition 
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112 The Protocol for the Establishment of the EAC Common Market (2009), adopted on 
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Mohochi relied on the fundamental principles established by the EAC 
Treaty, including his human rights as provided by the African Charter. 
Since the reference made mention of a human rights violation, an 
objection to the Court's human rights jurisdiction was inevitably raised. The 
EACJ reiterated that article 27(2) of the EAC Treaty does not intend in any 
way to limit the Court from interpreting and applying any provision of the 
EAC Treaty, including all provisions making reference to human rights.122 
Three issues were determined on merit: the conformity to the EAC Treaty 
with Uganda's sovereignty to deny entry to nationals of other EAC 
countries for security reasons; the requirement to inform Mohochi of the 
reasons that led to his being denied entry into Uganda; and whether the 
act of arresting, detaining and expelling Mohochi contravened the EAC 
Treaty and the Protocol, which provide for the right to free movement. 
During the hearing of the case the Attorney General of Uganda submitted 
that Uganda is an independent state and not submerged by the 
establishment of the EAC.123 This submission by the Attorney General 
might be a reflection of the ignorance of Member States of the legal 
regime of the EAC. 
Like all EAC States, Uganda has given the EAC Treaty the force of law in 
its territory.124 Thus, the EACJ acknowledges Uganda to be a sovereign 
state and has the "power to deny entry to … citizens of EAC Partner 
States". But the power is to be exercised "in accordance with the law", 
including Community laws governing the right to freedom of movement. 
The EACJ went on to hold that: 
Sovereignty, therefore, cannot not take away the precedence of Community 
law, cannot stand as a defence or justification for noncompliance with Treaty 
obligations and neither can it act to exempt, impede or restrain Uganda from 
ensuring that her actions and laws are in conformity with requirements of the 
Treaty or the Protocol. 
When summing up, the Court found that the actions of the immigration 
officials had been in violation of the freedom of movement of the applicant, 
which constitutes part of the foundational principles of the Common Market 
Protocol, and of article 104 of the Treaty.125 In addition, the EACJ granted 
Mohochi's requests for declaratory relief, including a declaration that 
Uganda's Citizenship and Immigration Control Act was "rendered 
                                            
122 Mohochi v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 5/2011 (17 May 2013) 26. 
123 Mohochi v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 5/2011 (17 May 2013) 45. 
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inoperative and ha[s] no force of law" to the extent that the Act conflicts 
with EAC free movement rules.126 The EACJ further found Uganda to be in 
breach of articles 104 of the Treaty and Article 7(6) of the Protocol. 
Mohochi's case came up in the context of the two bombing attacks in 
Kampala that killed 74 people on 11 July 2010.127 The terrorist group, Al-
Shabaab, claimed responsibility. Following the attacks, Ugandan officials 
arrested a number of suspects from Kenya. During the trial the suspects' 
counsel, Al-Amin Kimath, was detained after his visit to Uganda, where he 
was to appear on behalf of his clients, the suspects.128 Al-Amin Kimath is a 
renowned human rights activist from Kenya, whose detention was widely 
condemned by a number of organisations and individuals including 
Mohochi. It is believed that Uganda targeted Mohochi because of his 
support for the campaign to free Kimath.129 
Under similar circumstances, Mbugua Mureithi Wa Nyambura was a 
member of the legal team, including Kimath, that was instructed to 
represent the terror suspects. After landing in Uganda Nyambura was 
arrested at gunpoint, harassed, imprisoned with his clients for two days, 
and then expelled from the country without being given any explanations. 
In his quest to seek redress before the EACJ, in the matter between 
Nyambura v Attorney General of Uganda,130 Nyambura was unable to 
meet the Court's two months threshold for filing a case.131 Inspired by the 
decision in the Omar Awadh case, where the AD completely shut the door 
on any hopes of extending the time limit, it was held that: 
… [T]he principle of legal certainty requires strict application of the time-limit 
in Article 30(2) of the Treaty. Furthermore, nowhere does the Treaty provide 
any power to the Court to extend, to condone, to waive, or to modify the 
prescribed time limit for any reason (including for 'continuing violations').132 
EALS v Attorney General of Burundi133 is the most recent EACJ matter 
dealing with the right to freedom of movement. Distinct from the two 
previous cases, in which the applicants had been denied entrance into 
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another country, this case is about an applicant's being restricted from 
moving outside his country. The regional Bar Association represented the 
applicant, Isidore Rufyikiri, who was the President of the Bar Association 
of Burundi. The applicants challenged the prosecution before the Anti-
Corruption Court, disbarment from the Roll of Advocates, and the 
prohibition on Rufyikiri's travelling outside Burundi on the grounds that 
these actions were contrary to the EAC Treaty.134 Rufyikiri was restrained 
from travelling by the order of the Public Prosecutor.135 
The EACJ found that due process had not been carried out in prosecuting 
Mr Rufyikiri before an Anti-Corruption Court, disbarring him from the Table 
of Barristers and prohibiting him from travelling outside Burundi, which 
actions were in violation of the founding principles of the EAC.136 What is 
significant in this Court's decision is the directives issued. The directives 
were for implementing the judgment by commanding Burundi to ensure the 
implementation of the judgment, as well as tasking the Office of the 
Secretary General to oversee the whole implementation process.137 The 
EACJ normally issues declaratory orders but does not give any 
compliance directives. 
In summary, the cases handled by the EACJ on free movement do not 
amount to a success story. They are a reflection of the challenges faced 
by litigants in terms of accessibility, the scope of the Court's interpretive 
mandate, and the nature of the remedies granted to successful 
applicants.138 It has been submitted that the EACJ's scope of interpreting 
its role in ensuring free movement is narrow.139 
3.3 Limited role in trade 
There is little to not about the EACJ's engagement in commercial matters. 
Commercial law advocates have refrained from litigating in the EACJ on 
matters concerning trade. Such restraint is contrary to the major purpose 
of EAC integration, which is largely trade oriented, beginning with a 
customs union, proceeding to a common market, and culminating in a 
monetary union. Despite the fact that trade is a priority, the prevailing legal 
infrastructure on business law within the EAC is still very much national, 
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which could be one of the factors discouraging traders from resorting to 
the EACJ.140 There have also been attempts by individuals to seek 
damages141 and declarations on the violation of Treaty principles142 
against their respective governments in matters relating to business. 
Another factor to take into account could be the EACJ's jurisdictional 
mandate and the nature of its judgment. The Court's lack of remedial 
power in awarding damages may be a reason why it is not preferred by the 
business sector for resolving their business disputes.143 The EACJ does 
not grant damages, unlike national courts. As to accessibility, the EACJ 
cannot receive cases between individuals (legal and natural persons). The 
EACJ can only find the conduct of governments and EAC institutions to be 
inconsistent with the EAC Treaty or its Protocols.144 The remedial nature 
and the scope of the accessibility could account for the rarity of the 
submission of trade cases to the Court.  
The very first trade case dealt with by the EACJ was the Modern Holdings 
case.145 The applicant was aggrieved by the respondent – the Kenyan 
Port Authority - after it refused to clear and release consignments imported 
through its port, contrary to the spirit of the EAC Treaty and the East 
African Community Customs Management Act and Regulations. The 
EACJ reasoned that the duty to ensure "the development of efficient and 
profitable sea port services" as provided in the EAC Treaty146 lies purely 
with Member States.147 An attempt by the claimant to hold Kenya 
accountable for not creating legal avenues for filing a similar case at the 
national level had proved futile. The applicant had not included the 
Attorney General of Kenya in the case, leading to the Court's dismissing 
the case on the grounds of a want of proper parties.  
In the Alcon Intl Ltd case the EACJ was asked to interpret the EAC Treaty 
and the Customs Union and Common Market Protocol in a matter that 
involved cross-border investment.148 Alcon Intl Ltd, a Kenyan registered 
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company, sued the Ugandan Government, Standard Chartered and the 
National Social Security Fund, both registered in Uganda. The matter 
arose after Standard Chartered Bank issued a bank guarantee to Alcon 
Intl Ltd which later successfully received an $8million arbitral award from 
the Ugandan high court and the court of appeal. The award was later 
denied by the supreme court of Uganda, causing the applicant to seek 
rescue from the EACJ's.149 Before the EACJ, the case against Standard 
Chartered Bank was dismissed on the premise that it was not an 
appropriate party to the case, and the claims against Uganda were also 
dismissed on the grounds that the cause of action advanced by the 
applicant occurred prior to the entry into force of the Common Market 
Protocol. 
International courts have a role in building their own reputation. The cases 
described above lead to the hypothesis that initially commercial actors 
across the region had faith in the Court. The cases brought were purely 
trade disputes. Unfortunately, none of the trade cases was decided on 
merit. The EACJ thereby "built a wall" guarding itself against the ingress of 
commercial actors from across the region. These were among the early 
cases taken to the Court. The Court somehow missed the opportunity to 
encourage commercial actors to take their cases to it by applying the 
Treaty strictly. There had been a chance for the Court to hold governments 
accountable for failing to create a suitable business environment. That 
opportunity was spurned. 
4 Conclusion  
This article has audited the functioning of the EACJ since its existence, 
and projects its effectiveness in the coming years, based on the Court's 
emerging jurisprudence and the prevailing provisions affecting it. 
Therefore, this article concludes that the EACJ is falling short of its 
authority in matters directly linked to EAC integration, such as trade. The 
shortcomings are caused by the existence of gaps in the EAC Treaty and 
the narrow interpretation of the role of the EACJ. Consequently, the EACJ 
has failed to establish its role in shaping the EAC.  
On a positive note, there is evidence of variety in its actions, which covers 
the scope of EAC integration ambitions.150 One notable feature of the 
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EACJ so far has been its attempt to develop an authority of its own. It is 
acknowledged that human rights is an important ingredient in any 
integration aspiration. However, much needs to be accomplished if the 
EACJ is to adequately protect human rights. So far the EACJ has been 
found wanting when exercising its interpretive jurisdiction due to the 
ambiguity of its role in human rights.151 While the EACJ has been trying to 
protect human rights, its legitimacy in adjudicating such matters is highly 
questionable. Upon consideration of its initial jurisdiction, its admissibility 
rules and the status of its judgment, it must be concluded that EACJ is 
scarcely a potent protector of human rights. For example, a human rights 
Court cannot succeed if there is a strict application of a time limitation 
clause like that to be found in article 30(2) of the EAC Treaty. A 
consideration of its human rights decisions exposes the Court's reliance 
on the rule of law and the principles of good governance as instruments 
pertaining to violations of rights. Nevertheless, the EACJ's lack of authority 
in matters pertaining to human rights should not undermine the relevance 
of human rights in the EAC integration project. Traditionally, human rights 
were never an integration issue.152 The law has evolved, and now 
integration laws recognise human rights as an important ingredient in any 
integration arrangements. 
On trade, which is at the heart of the EAC project, integration laws, 
including EAC law, are not designed to regulate daily activities in the 
business sector.153 As a result, business actors resort to national law or 
any other relevant law in resolving trade disputes. As shown above, the 
EACJ has not played a meaningful role in trade issues. Much of the blame 
can be placed on the Court's limited jurisdictional scope and remedial 
authority as well as its lack of compliance mechanisms. The newly 
adopted Protocol could have addressed these issues, but the opportunity 
was wasted by Member States. This might give rise to the perception that 
the Member States are not ready to see the EACJ as effectively 
authoritative. As long as these constraints persist, the EACJ will not be 
used by commercial actors. The cross-border activities in the region 
constantly trigger disputes, mostly on business matters, which the EACJ 
cannot adequately deal with at the moment.154 Also, major integration 
projects such as roads, ports, railways, oil, gas and minerals are underway 
and are likely to give rise to disputes. 
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If one were to grade the performance of the EACJ, the grade would be 
"average". Much of the Court's time has been spent on establishing its 
own human rights practice. But it is only the Court's strategy in this regard 
that has been widely appreciated, not its decisions. The new Protocol 
does not give the EACJ an explicit human rights mandate. Instead, the 
Member States have drafted a Protocol that claims to extend the EACJ's 
authority on trade and investment matters,155 a mandate which the Court 
has under article 23 and 27 of the EAC Treaty. The Protocol has not dealt 
with some of the major challenges associated with the working of the 
EACJ. To sum up, apart from its being praised as a human rights lobbyist, 
the EACJ's lack of authority has made it impossible for it to achieve 
anything of substance in the period since its establishment. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Alter, Helfer and McAllister 2013 AJIL  
Alter K, Helfer LR and McAllister JR "A New International Human Rights 
Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice" 2013 
AJIL 737-779 
Alter, Gathii and Helfer 2016 EJIL  
Alter K, Gathii JT and Helfer LR "Backlash against International Courts in 
West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences" 2016 EJIL 
293-328 
Birmingham 1969 Va J Int'l L 
Birmingham RL "Economic Integration in East Africa: Distribution of Gains" 
1969 Va J Int'l L 408-443 
Bossa 2006 EAJHRD 
Bossa S "Towards a Protocol Extending the Jurisdiction of the East 
African Court of Justice" 2006 EAJHRD 31-38 
Cowell 2013 HRLR 
Cowell F "The Death of the Southern African Development Community 
Tribunal's Human Rights Jurisdiction" 2013 HRLR 153-165 
De Wet 2013 ICSID Review 
                                            
155 Such a mandate will enable the EACJ to effectively implement Chapter 12 of the 
EAC Treaty, establishing the basis for cooperation in investment and industrial 
development within the region.  
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 35 
De Wet E "The Rise and Fall of the Tribunal of the Southern African 
Development Community: Implications for Dispute Settlement in Southern 
Africa" 2013 ICSID Review 1-19 
Gathii 2013 Duke J Comp & Int'l L 
Gathii JT "Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African 
Court of Justice's Human Rights Strategy" 2013 Duke J Comp & Int'l L 
249-296 
Gathii 2016 Chi J Int'l L 
Gathii JT "Saving the Serengeti: Africa's New International Judicial 
Environmentalism" 2016 Chi J Int'l L 386-438 
Gathii 2016 Law & Contemp Probs 
Gathii JT "Variation in the Use of Sub-regional Integration Courts between 
Business and Human Rights Actors: The Case of the East African Court of 
Justice" 2016 Law & Contemp Probs 37-62 
Hailu 2014 Mizan L Rev 
Hailu MB "Regional Economic Integration in Africa: Challenges and 
Prospects" 2014 Mizan L Rev 299-332 
Helfer and Alter 2013 Theo Inq L 
Helfer LR and Alter KJ "Legitimacy and Law Making: A Tale of Three 
International Courts" 2013 Theo Inq L 479-503 
Jonas 2013 IHRLR 
Jonas O "Neutering the SADC Tribunal by Blocking Individuals' Access to 
the Tribunal" 2013 IHRLR 294-321 
Meckler 2016 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 
Meckler S "A Human Rights ‘Monster’ that Devoured No One: The Far-
Reaching Impact of Dismantling the SADC Tribunal" 2016 NYU J Int'l L & 
Pol 1007-1038 
Murungi and Gallinetti 2010 SUR - Int'l J Hum Rts 
Murungi LN and Gallinetti J "The Role of Sub-regional Courts in the 
African Human Rights System" 2010 SUR - Int'l J Hum Rts 119-143 
Nathan 2013 Hum Rts Q 
Nathan L "The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale" 2013 
Hum Rts Q 870-892  
Ojienda 2004 EAJHRD 
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 36 
Ojienda T "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: Preliminary Reflections on 
the Jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice" 2004 EAJHRD 94-103 
Onoria 2010 Afr J Int'l & Comp L 
Onoria H "Locus Standi of Individuals and Non-state Entities before 
Regional Economic Integration Judicial Bodies in Africa" 2010 Afr J Int'l & 
Comp L 143-169 
Onoria 2010 J Afr L 
Onoria H 2010 "Botched-up Elections, Treaty Amendments and Judicial 
Independence in the East African Community" 2010 J Afr L 74-94 
Orloff 1968 Colum J Transnat'l L 
Orloff N "Economic Integration in East Africa: The Treaty for East-African 
Cooperation" 1968 Colum J Transnat'l L 302-332 
Possi 2015 AHRLJ 
Possi A "Striking a Balance Between Community Norms and Human 
Rights: The Continuing Struggle of the East African Court of Justice" 2015 
AHRLJ 192-213 
Van der Mei 2009 ZaöRV 
Van der Mei AP "Regional Integration: The Contribution of the Court of 
Justice of the East African Community" 2009 ZaöRV 403-425 
Case law 
EACJ 
Alcon Intl Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank of Uganda Ref No 6/2010 (2 
September 2013) 
Alice Nayebare v EALS Arbitration Cause No 1/2012 
Amudo v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 4/2014 (30 July 2015) 
ANAW v Attorney General of Tanzania Appeal No 3/2010 (26 April 2012) 
Anyang’ Nyong’o v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 1/2006 (29 March 
2007) 
Attorney General of Uganda v Omar Awadh Appeal No 2/2012 (15 April 
2013) 
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 37 
Burundi Journalists Union v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 7/2013 
(15 May 2015) 
Calist Mwatela v EAC App No 1/2015 (31 October 2007) 
Democratic Party v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 1/2014 (28 
July 2015) 
EALS v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 1/2014 (15 May 2015) 
EALS v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2007 (31 August 2008) 
EALS v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 1/2011 (14 January 2013) 
Francois v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 8/2011 (28 February 2014) 
IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Ref No 3/2010 (29 June 2011) 
IMLU v Attorney General of Kenya Appeal No 1/2011 (15 March 2012) 
Kahoho v Secretary General of the EAC Appeal No 2/2013 (9 November 
2015) 
Katabazi v Uganda Ref No 1/2007 (1 November 2007) 
Katuntu v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 5/2012 (23 November 
2013)  
Komu v Attorney General of Tanzania Ref No 7/2010 (26 September 
2014) 
Kyarimpa v Attorney General of Uganda Appeal No 6/2014 (19 February 
2016) 
Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory 
Opinion Opinion No 1/2008 
Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the EAC for an Advisory 
Opinion Opinion No 1/2015 
Modern Holdings (EA) Limited v Kenya Ports Authority Ref No 1/2008 (11 
February 2009) 
Mohochi v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 5/2011 (17 May 2013) 
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 38 
Mureithi Wa Nyambura v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 11/2011 (24 
February 2014) 
Ndayizamba v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 3/2012 (28 March 
2014) 
Ndorimana v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 2/2013 (28 November 
2014) 
Rugumba v Attorney General of Rwanda Ref No 8/2010 (30 November 
2011) 
Rugumba v Attorney General of Rwanda Appeal No 1/2012 (21 June 
2012) 
Ruhara v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 4/2014 (7 August 2015) 
Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 1/2010 (30 July 2011) 
Sebalu v Secretary General of the EAC Ref No 8/2012 (22 November 
2013) 
Steven Dennis v Attorney General of Burundi Ref No 3/2015 (31 March 
2017) 
Tusiime v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 11/2013 (7 August 2015) 
Walusumbi v Attorney General of Uganda Ref No 8/2013 (27 February 
2015) 
SADC Tribunal 
Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe SADC (T) 02/2007 (28 November 
2008) 
Legislation 
Uganda 
East African Community Act, 2002 
Citizenship and Immigration Control Act 5 of 2009 
International instruments 
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 39 
AU 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) 
EAC 
East African Community Treaty (1999) 
East African Court of Justice Rules of Procedure (2013) 
East African Community Customs Management Act (2004) 
East African Community Customs Management Regulations (2010) 
Protocol for the Establishment of the East African Community Common 
Market (2009) 
Protocol for the Establishment of the East African Community Customs 
Union (2004) 
Protocol for the Establishment of the East African Community Monetary 
Union (2013) 
Protocol on Decision Making by the Council of the East African Community 
(2001) 
Protocol to Operationalise the Extended Jurisdiction of the East African 
Court of Justice (2015) 
ECOWAS 
Supplementary Protocol Amending Protocol Relating to the Community 
Court of Justice (2005) 
SADC 
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (1992) 
UN 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
Internet sources 
EAC 2013 http://repository.eac.int/handle/11671/546 
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 40 
East African Community 2013 Communiqué of the 15th Ordinary Summit of 
the EAC Heads of State http://repository.eac.int/handle/11671/546 
accessed 6 August 2018 
EAC 2016 http://www.eac.int/news-and-
media/statements/20160415/communique-signing-ceremony-treaty-
accession-republic-south-sudan-east-african-community 
East African Community 2016 Signing Ceremony of the Treaty of 
Accession of the Republic of South Sudan into the EAC 
http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/statements/20160415/communique-
signing-ceremony-treaty-accession-republic-south-sudan-east-african-
community accessed 21 February 2017  
EACJ date unknown http://eacj.org/?page_id=19 
East African Court of Justice date unknown Establishment 
http://eacj.org/?page_id=19 accessed 10 February 2017 
EALA 2012 http://www.eala.org/media/view/bill-on-human-rights-is-
passed-by-eala 
East African Legislative Assembly 2012 Bill on Human Rights is passed by 
EALA http://www.eala.org/media/view/bill-on-human-rights-is-passed-by-
eala accessed 27 February 2017 
Helfer 2015 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653124 
Helfer LR 2015 Sub-regional Courts in Africa: Litigating the Hybrid Right to 
Freedom of Movement https://ssrn.com/abstract=2653124 accessed 14 
February 2017 
MCIArb 2016 http://blogaila.com/2016/03/18/the-east-african-court-of-
justices-arbitral-jurisdiction-over-commercial-contract-disputes-by-dr-
faustin-ntezilyayo/ 
MCIArb FN 2016 The East African Court of Justice’s Arbitral Jurisdiction 
over Commercial Contract Disputes http://blogaila.com/2016/03/18/the-
east-african-court-of-justices-arbitral-jurisdiction-over-commercial-contract-
disputes-by-dr-faustin-ntezilyayo/ accessed 17 February 2017 
Mwanza 2015 https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7126-the-eac-
court-s-jurisdiction-over-investment-matters-and-what-it-means-for-the-
community-s-legal-instruments.html 
Mwanza W 2015 The EAC Court’s Jurisdiction over Investment Matters 
and what it means for the Community’s Legal Instruments 
https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7126-the-eac-court-s-jurisdiction-
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 41 
over-investment-matters-and-what-it-means-for-the-community-s-legal-
instruments.html accessed 15 February 2017 
Nalule 2016 http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/ 
Nalule C 2016 Defining the Scope of Free Movement of Citizens in the 
East African Community: The East African Court of Justice and its 
Interpretative Approach http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/ accessed 20 February 
2017 
Possi 2016 https://africlaw.com/2016/02/01/its-official-the-east-african-
court-of-justice-can-now-adjudicate-human-rights-cases/#more-1048 
Possi A 2016 It’s Official: The East African Court of Justice can now 
Adjudicate Human Rights Cases https://africlaw.com/2016/02/01/its-
official-the-east-african-court-of-justice-can-now-adjudicate-human-rights-
cases/#more-1048 accessed 28 February 2017 
Ruhangisa 2011 http://eacj.org/2014/docs/EACJ-Ten-Years-of-
Operation.pdf 
Ruhangisa JE 2011 The East African Court of Justice: Ten Years of 
Operation (Achievements and Challenges) 
http://eacj.org/2014/docs/EACJ-Ten-Years-of-Operation.pdf accessed 24 
February 2017 
List of Abbreviations 
AD Appellate Division 
AHRLJ African Human Rights Law Journal 
Afr J Int'l & Comp L African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 
AJIL American Journal of International Law 
AU African Union 
Chi J Int'l L Chicago Journal of International Law 
Colum J Transnat'l L Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
DP Democratic Party 
Duke J Comp & Int'l L Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 
EAC East African Community 
EACA East African Court of Appeal 
EACJ  East African Court of Justice 
EALA East African Legislative Assembly 
EALS East African Law Society 
A POSSI  PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 42 
EAJHRD East African Journal of Human Rights and 
Democracy  
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African 
States 
EJIL European Journal of International Law 
FID First Instance Division 
HRLR Human Rights Law Review 
Hum Rts Q Human Rights Quarterly 
IHRLR International Human Rights Law Review 
IMLU Independent Medical Legal Unit 
J Afr L Journal of African Law 
Law & Contemp Probs Law and Contemporary Problems 
Mizan L Rev Mizan Law Review 
NYU J Int'l L & Pol New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
REC Sub-regional organisation 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SADCC Southern Africa Development Coordinating 
Conference 
SUR - Int'l J Hum Rts SUR - International Journal on Human 
Rights 
Theo Inq L Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
UN United Nations 
Va J Int'l L Virginia Journal of International Law 
ZaöRV Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht 
 
